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Abstract 
 
Annett (2001) has made an in-depth critique of subjectivity in science, concentrating not 
only on those rating scales which are extensively used in ergonomics, but also the very 
philosophy of subjectivism itself.  The present authors take this critique and use it to 
reappraise their own interpretation of mental workload, a key concept popularly assessed 
by subjective measurement.  Having recently proposed a definition of mental workload 
(Young & Stanton, 2001), the present commentary considers deeper problems of 
subjectivity in the interpretation, perception, and measurement of mental workload.  It is 
realised that there are fundamental problems inherent with such a subjective concept, 
particularly concerned with the dependence on context and lack of an absolute metric.  
However, it is also noted that the very point of ergonomics is to address contextual 
influences on human performance.  Therefore, in the absence of a complete paradigm 
shift in ergonomics, the discipline will have to either accept or find ways of coping with 
the problems of subjectivity. 
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On the basis of a comprehensive literature review, Young & Stanton (2001) arrived at the 
following definition of mental workload (MWL): 
 
“The mental workload of a task represents the level of attentional resources required to 
meet both objective and subjective performance criteria, which may be mediated by task 
demands, external support, and past experience.” (p. 507) 
 
The definition was offered for a construct which had previously evaded having its 
meaning pinned down.  However, it was just an offering, and by no means argued as the 
ultimate formalisation of MWL.  Indeed, it was Young & Stanton’s (2001) own 
understanding of the available literature which led them to suggest the definition.  Now, 
in the light of Annett’s (2001) article, it seems there are three cans of subjective worms 
associated with it. 
 
The first is the problem of interpretation.  The authors had their own backgrounds and 
knowledge bases serving as (albeit possibly implicit) frames of reference and agendas for 
the review.  Being researchers in cognitive ergonomics, it is unsurprising that their 
definition was couched in terms of attention and performance.  This does not necessarily 
mean such an approach was right or wrong – any expert in the arena would undoubtedly 
have done a similar thing.  A stress researcher would have reviewed the stress literature 
and defined MWL in terms of stress reactions.  Whether or not Young & Stanton’s 
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(2001) definition becomes accepted depends on the extent to which other researchers in 
the area agree with it, which in turn depends on the degree of overlap between their 
interests.  This cuts to the heart of the intersubjectivity issue to which Annett (2001) 
refers, only at a more macro level: “Progress in science depends on the degree of shared 
meaning between individuals concerning their observations and experiences.” (this 
issue).  Annett argues that intersubjectivity is crucial for laboratory measurements to be 
valid.  However, it is just as vital amongst those scientists making the measurements to 
agree on the concepts they are measuring.  Science (with a capital “S”) is, after all, a 
belief system, itself governed by the vagaries of subjective interpretation.  Just like any 
other belief system, there has to be a certain leap of faith to accept some of the concepts 
and theories. 
 
Secondly, Young & Stanton (2001) introduce subjectivity into the definition by allowing 
MWL to be influenced by the internal goals of the individual.  This is where the 
definition gets quite knotty, since these goals will vary between individuals and across 
situations.  With such a context-specific construct, one might argue whether a definition 
is of any practical use at all.  To illustrate this, take the perception of time.  Our 
definitions of time – seconds, minutes, hours, and even months – are largely arbitrary, 
and would be of little use if we were spending our lives on another planet.  However, for 
all intents and purposes, the 24-hour day is sufficient, since there are few people 
concerned with measuring time relative to different planetary orbits or rotations.  So, 
specific to the context of Earth, our definition of time is useful.  But outside that context 
it begins to lose its practicality and even its ‘absoluteness’ – time can even be affected by 
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altitude, speed, or relative direction (cesium clocks have been shown to lose time when 
travelling eastwards, and gain time westwards).  The same goes for MWL, but the 
context scale is much smaller – rather than planet to planet, it changes from person to 
person.  If the meaning of MWL for a given person in a particular situation is different 
from that for another person in a different situation (or even the same person in a 
different situation etc.), defining it in these terms seemingly has as much use as an atomic 
clock on Jupiter.  The Science of Ergonomics, though, is all about context.  As Tom 
Stewart observed at this year’s Ergonomics Society Lecture, every good ergonomist will 
tell you that human performance depends on its context.  Predictions, therefore, can only 
be made with reference to that context, so by implication, all of our theories must be 
context-specific. 
 
Finally, there is the complex issue of MWL measurement.  Many authors claim that the 
use of subjective ratings may well be the only index of ‘true’ MWL (e.g., Hart & 
Staveland, 1988).  Subjective MWL scores have been shown to be sensitive to perceived 
difficulty (Liu & Wickens, 1994) and demand for multiple resources (Hockey, Briner, 
Tattersall & Wiethoff, 1989).  One particular advantage with subjective measures is that 
they are sensitive to changes in effort, when such effort maintains primary task 
performance at stable levels (Hockey et al., 1989). 
 
One of the hurdles in deriving a subjective measure of MWL is validating it by 
correlation with other measures (such as physiological evidence) or against objective 
demand.  Annett (2001) suggests the method of cross-modal matching to quantify 
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psychometric scales, and perhaps descriptors of weight (e.g., this task is ‘heavy’, ‘light’ 
etc.) would provide an adequate analogy for MWL.  But this raises the question of 
whether there is such a thing as ‘objective demand’, or whether – especially in a field 
trying to improve design – it is simply what people perceive that is important.  If the 
latter is the case, it will mean there is no need for the use of an anchor task to calibrate 
subjective scales. 
 
Criticisms of subjective measurement techniques are primarily concerned with the 
metacognitive abilities of the operator (Petrusic & Cloutier, 1992; Praetorius & Duncan, 
1988).  That is, given the fact that the measures are necessarily administered post-task, 
one might question the reliability of self-reports, particularly for long task durations.  A 
recent attempt to develop an instantaneous (i.e., ‘on-line’) measure of subjective MWL 
met with limited success (Tattersall & Foord, 1996).  Unfortunately, whilst it correlated 
with other measures of workload, it was disruptive to the primary task.  These effects are 
further complicated by a Heisenberg-esque uncertainty principle – that the act of 
measurement itself is also demanding, so may influence MWL ratings.   
 
In exploring a philosophical view of MWL, then, it would seem that the many problems 
of definition and measurement are down to the subjective nature of the beast.  Whether it 
is the measurement, the experience, or even the very Science of MWL, there really is no 
absolute truth, only perceptions of truth.  Hardly anyone would argue against the 
existence of such a thing as MWL, though, since we all experience it frequently.  But the 
fact that it means different things to different people at different times causes problems 
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for applied research.  How are we supposed to design a system for “optimal MWL” when 
such a state will probably only exist for an infinitesimally brief period of time?  As every 
good ergonomist will tell you, “It’s all relative”, as context is definitely the current 
zeitgeist in Ergonomics.  Unless a better paradigm emerges, we will have to find ways of 
working within it.  Perhaps the key will be to draw up a list of “mindspace” tables to 
design for cognitive ergonomics, just like the Bodyspace data for physical ergonomics 
(Pheasant, 1986).  With such data, the logical positivist approach to MWL research 
(which we in particular have taken in our laboratory) could be justified as more science 
than art. 
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